Abstract-This paper considers a massive MIMO network that includes one multiple-antenna base station, one multiple-antenna eavesdropper, and K single-antenna users. The eavesdropper operates in passive mode and tries to overhear the confidential information from one of the users in the down-link transmission. In order to secure the confidential information, two artificial noise (AN)-aiding schemes are proposed. In the first scheme, AN is injected into the downlink training signals to prevent the eavesdropper from obtaining the correct channel state information of the eavesdropping link. In the second scheme, AN is deployed in both downlink training phase and payload data transmission phase to further degrade the eavesdropping channel. Analytical expressions and tight approximations of the achievable secrecy rate of the considered systems are derived with taking imperfect channel estimation and two types of precoding, i.e., maximumratio-transmission and zero-forcing, into consideration. Optimization algorithms for power allocation are proposed to enhance the secrecy performance of the proposed AN-aiding schemes. The results reveal that deploying AN in the downlink training phase of massive MIMO networks does not affect the downlink channel estimation process at users while enabling the system to suppress the downlink channel estimation process at eavesdropper. As a consequence, the proposed AN-aided schemes improve the system performance significantly. Furthermore, implementing AN in both phases allows the considered system having a flexible solution to maximize its secrecy performance at the price of higher complexity.
Secure Massive MIMO With the Artificial
Noise-Aided Downlink Training nature of wireless channels, adversary can easily intercept the confidential messages. The conventional method for security is to implement cryptographic encryption in the application layers. However, this approach is potentially vulnerable to malicious attack because it is based on assumptions of computational complexity [1] . Recently, physical layer security (PLS) [2] has attracted a broad attention from the research community as a complement to the traditional cryptographic encryption. PLS takes advantage of the randomness of wireless channels to enhance the secrecy performance of wireless communication.
PLS concept was first outlined in [3] in which a network consisting of an information source, an intended receiver, and a passive eavesdropper was considered. It has shown that the perfect secured transmission between Alice and Bob can be achieved as long as the condition of the legitimate channel is better than that of the eavesdropping channel. Usually, eavesdroppers operate in the passive mode to prevent the legitimate side from obtaining their channel state information (CSI) [4] . There have been methods to improve the condition of the legitimate channels and degrade the eavesdropping channel's quality, e.g., using multiple antennas and/or using AN-aiding source [5] . Combining multiple-antennas and AN can further enhance the secrecy performance when precoding is implemented to cancel the interference at the legitimate users while suppressing the illegitimate channels [5] - [7] .
Recently, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) network has attracted a lot of attention from the research community and has become the key candidate for next generation wireless networks [8] - [10] . By using a very large number of antennas to serve several users simultaneously in the same frequency band, massive MIMO network offers great power efficiency and spectral efficiency [11] - [13] . In massive MIMO, with time-duplex division (TDD), the number of antennas at the base station (BS) does not affect the resources needed for the channel estimation. Therefore, TDD is more preferable than frequency-duplex division (FDD). In TDD operation, the BS and users exchange their CSI over uplink and dowlink training phases. In uplink training, the users send their pilots to the BS. The BS estimates the channel based on the knowledge of the pilots and then creates the precoding matrix. In dowlink training, the BS processes beamforming pilot to users and then users estimate the effective channels. These effective channels are used in decoding information in the payload data transmission phase. However, these processes enable the illegitimate side to gain CSI of the eavesdropping channels. As a consequence, the eavesdropper can take advantage on this knowledge to successfully decode the transmitted information from the base station in the downlink transmission. Therefore, protecting the training phases from exposing to the illegitimate side is crucial [14] , where deploying AN in protecting downlink training phase of massive MIMO network is promising.
A. Related Works
There have been several studies on PLS in massive MIMO network using AN. In [15] , a hybrid spatial and temporal AN scheme to protect the confidential information in a masive MIMO OFDM system was proposed. In this work, the spatial AN is injected to the precoded signal and also transmitted into the orthogonal direction of the information vector. The paper [16] investigated the secrecy performance of a massive MIMO system in the presence of one multi-antennas eavesdropper and hardware impairment effects. A generalized null-space AN in payload data transmission phase was proposed to deal with the effect of hardware impairment. In [17] , Zhu et al. proposed a low complexity joint data and AN precoding scheme in a massive MIMO network with limited number of RF chains. Various AN schemes for secrecy enhancement in massive MIMO systems with distributed antennas were proposed in [18] . Chen et al. [19] suggested a symbol phase rotated scheme to protect the massive MIMO system from a massive MIMO eavesdropper. The results have shown that the proposed scheme can prevent the massive MIMO eavesdropper from recovering most of the transmitted symbols. In [20] , various data precoders and AN precoders were proposed to secure the multi-cell massive MIMO system when the eavesdropper's CSI is unavailable. In [21] , a phaseonly zero-forcing (ZF) AN scheme was studied to reduce the complexity in computing the conventional ZF AN for securing the massive MIMO network. In [22] , Wang et al. investigated the performance of an AN jamming-aided scheme at the transmitter over Rician channels. Furthermore, Zhu et al. [23] used null-space and random AN generated from the spare antennas at the BS for securing the multi-cell massive MIMO system. However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no work investigating the AN-based scheme in the downlink training phase of massive MIMO.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we consider a massive MIMO downlink in the presence of a multiple-antenna eavesdropper. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose two AN-aiding schemes, i.e., downlink training phase AN-aiding scheme and both phases (downlink training phase and payload data transmission phase) ANaiding scheme to secure the massive MIMO network in the presence of a multiple-antenna eavesdropper. Furthermore, the effect of imperfect channel estimation is also considered.
• In order to study the behaviors of the proposed AN-aiding schemes on the massive MIMO network, we develop analytical expressions and tight approximations of the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system in two cases where the system uses maximum ratio transmission (MRT) precoding and implements ZF precoding while taking into consideration the influence of imperfect channel estimation.
• Optimization algorithms of extremely low-complexity for power allocation are also developed to enhance the secrecy performance of the two proposed AN-aiding schemes. By applying these algorithms, we show that the secrecy performance of the considered system is significantly enhanced. The results show that deploying AN in the downlink training phase of massive MIMO networks can confuse the eavesdropper's channel estimation while staying harmless to the channel estimation process at the users. In addition, using AN in both phases offers the system a flexible solution to maximize its secrecy performance at the price of a higher complexity in the power allocation process. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system and channel models are described in Section II. The analytical expressions and tight approximations for the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system with the two proposed AN-aiding schemes are developed in Section III and Section IV. In Section V, optimization algorithms for power allocation are proposed. The numerical results based on Monte-Carlo methods and discussions are presented in Section VI. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section VII.
Notations: Subscripts (·) T , (·) * , and (·) H stand for the transpose, the conjugate, and the conjugate transpose, respectively. The expectation operation, variance operation, and Euclidean norm are denoted by (·)
* , E {·}, var(·), and · , respectively. C M×N represents the space of all M × N matrices with complex-valued elements. I N denotes the N -dimensional identity matrix. CN (μ, σ 2 ) indicates complex normal distribution with μ mean and σ 2 variance.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
Consider a massive MIMO network which includes one M -antenna BS, K single-antenna end users (EUs), and one N -antenna eavesdropper as described in Fig. 1 .
In this system, the BS transmits information to the k-th EU,
is the small-scale fading vector, h k ∼ CN (0, I M ), and β k models the large-scale fading. We assume that all the K users share the same time-frequency resource.
The eavesdropper tries to eavesdrop the confidential information from the BS through the channel matrix √ β E G ∈ C M×N , where the elements of G follow i.i.d. CN (0, 1), and β E models the large-scale fading.
A. Uplink Training
All K EUs simultaneously send their orthogonal pilots to the BS for CSI acquisition. The received signal at the BS is
where ω k ∈ C τu×1 are the orthogonal pilot sequences of the length τ u , i.e., ω 
where n BS ∼ CN (0, σ 2 0 I τu ). From (2), the BS deploys the MMSE technique to estimate the channel between the BS and U k . The channel estimateĥ k is given bŷ
where Λ x,y is the covariance matrix of random vectors x and y. The estimation error is defined as
From the MMSE's properties,h k andĥ k are mutually independent. Besides, we also haveh k ∼ CN 0,
B. Downlink Data Transmission
After performing the channel estimation, BS uses the estimated channels to precode the symbols intended for all K users. To enhance the secrecy performance, AN is injected to the transmit data as in [1] . Consequently, the transmitted signal vector at the BS is given by
where α IT p is the transmit power ratio for data, α IT n is the transmit power ratio for AN,
, is the vector of K symbols intended for the K users, and
where E |λ k | 2 = 1, is the AN vector which is independent of x. The AN matrix lies in the null-space of the estimated legitimate channels, i.e.,Ĥ T J = 0. From (5), the transmit power condition for downlink is E S BS 2 ≤ ρ d . As a result,
Note that α IT n = 0 corresponds to the case where no AN is added in the data transmission phase.
1) At End Users:
The received signals at U k is
where
2) At the Eavesdroppers:
The received signal at the eavesdropper is
C. Downlink Training
To detect the desired signal, the k-th UE needs to estimate the effective channel gain a kk . Typically, the BS beamforms the pilots using the precoding matrix in Section II-B. Then from the received pilot signals, each EU will estimate its corresponding effective channel gain [12] . During this phase, the eavesdropper can also estimate its desired effective channel (between the BS and the eavesdropper) in order to improve its ability of eavesdropping the confidential information from the BS. In this work, we propose to use AN during the training phase to enhance the secrecy performance. With our proposed scheme, AN is added into the training signal to contaminate the channel estimation at the eavesdropper. More precisely, the pilot signal beamformed from the BS is given by
where Φ ∈ C τ d ×K represents pilot sequences for K EUs, each of them has length
M×K , where z k 2 = 1, is the AN matrix, α p is the transmit power ratio for pilot, α n is the transmit power ratio for AN, and ρ d is the transmit power at the BS. The AN matrix is implemented in the null-space of the estimated downlink channels, where z k is chosen to satisfyĥ
Using (9), the transmit power condition for downlink pilot
Note that α n = 0 corresponds to the conventional case where no AN is added [12] .
1) At End Users:
The received signal at U k is
is the noise at U k . Since φ k is known at U k , U k can process the received signal as follows: (13) where
. U k estimates the effective channel a kk for decoding confidential messages in IT phase. EUs deploys the MMSE to estimate a kk . The estimated effective channel, i.e.,â kk is given as [24] (14) where (15) and
2) At Eavesdropper: During the downlink training, the eavesdropper intercepts the training information. The received signal at the eavesdropper is given as (17) where
Since the eavesdropper can easily have the knowledge of Φ, it can process the received signal as follows:
The eavesdropped information related to U k can be demonstrated aš
The eavesdropper uses the MMSE to estimate c k for decoding confidential messages in the payload data transmission phase. The estimated effective channel at the eavesdropper iŝ
and
D. Choosing Beamforming Matrix
In this paper, we consider two well-known precoding methods, i.e., MRT and ZF, which are widely implemented in massive MIMO systems. Being simple for implementation, MRT suffers from intra-interference, i.e., the undesired signals among users. Meanwhile, ZF precoding can effectively eliminate undesired signals among users at the price of high complexity.
1) MRT:
For MRT, the precoding matrix is
Following Appendix A, we have
E |a
var(a
2) ZF: For ZF, the precoding matrix is chosen to null out the undesired signals from multi-users with the knowledge of the channel estimated during the training phase. The ZF precoding matrix is
where v k is the k-th column of V :
BecauseĤ T V = I, we have:
Therefore,
The detailed proof of (32) is shown in Appendix A. Remark 1: From (26) and (32), it is observed that
Therefore, var(a
The following conditions hold true for both MRT and ZF. From (11), we have the condition for α p and α n as
Similarly, from (6), we have the condition for α 
The estimate of the effective channel at U k iŝ
From (39), the mean and variance ofâ
. The downlink channel estimation error is defined as
From (42), the mean and variance ofã MRT
2) ZF: Following Appendix B, we have E a
Remark 2: From (44) and (46), it is observed that var ã
. From (35), we have condition for AN noise power parameters as α
It means that the estimation error of the downlink at the legitimate users is independent to AN power parameters when the number of transmit antennas at the BS is large. Besides, var ã MRT,ZF kk can be reduced by improving the uplink training process and decreasing the number of users.
F. Estimated Effective Channel at the Eavesdropper
Following Appendix C, for both MRT and ZF, we have
As a consequence, we have
estimate of the effective channel at the eavesdropper iŝ
We have E {ĉ k } = 0 and
Estimation error at the eavesdropper is
with E {c k } = 0 and
Remark 3: The estimation error of the downlink at the eavesdropper depends on the AN power parameters which means that we can adjust the AN power parameter to maximize the advantage for the legitimate side. The downlink payload data transmission phases of the two proposed AN schemes are described in details in Section III and Section IV.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE IN DOWNLINK TRAINING ARTIFICIAL NOISE AIDING SCHEME In this section, we develop the tight approximations for the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system when the downlink training phase AN-aiding scheme is applied.
A. Achievable Legitimate Rate 1) MRT:
In the payload data transmission phase the BS transmits information to the users without AN. By plugging w k =ĥ * k ĥ * k into (7) and setting α IT n = 0, the received signal at U k is
where x k and x l are the desired confidential information for U k and U l , respectively. Obviously, a 2) ZF:
into (7) and setting α IT n = 0, the received signal at U k is
Obviously, a
Similar to the case of using MRT, the achievable legitimate rate at U k is expressed in (57) on the top of the next page.
The details of step (a) is demonstrated in Appendix E.
B. Achievable Eavesdropping Rate
From (7), setting α IT n = 0, the received signal at the eavesdropper in both cases of using MRT and ZF is
The eavesdropper performs MRC
The eavesdropper only has knowledge ofĉ k . Therefore, the achievable eavesdropping rate is described in (60) on the top of this page, where step (a) uses the identity (55).
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate
From (54), (57), and (59), the following lemma is given. Lemma 1: When downlink training phase AN-aiding scheme is applied, the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system is
where A = {MRT, ZF}, R A k and R E are given in (54), (57), and (60), respectively.
IV. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE IN BOTH PHASES ARTIFICIAL NOISE AIDING SCHEME
In this section, we develop a tight approximation for the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system when the both phases AN-aiding scheme is applied. In this scheme, the AN is added in the downlink training phase as in Section III. In the payload data transmission phase, AN is injected into the nullspace of the legitimate channels to confuse the eavesdropper. The AN matrix is chosen based on the knowledge of the estimated legitimate channels, i.e.,Ĥ
M×K , where j k 2 = 1, is the AN matrix.
A. Achievable Legitimate Rate 1) MRT: By plugging w
The achievable rate at U k is formulated in (63) on the top of the next page.
2) ZF:
into (7), the received signal at U k is
The achievable rate at U k is in (65) on top of this page.
B. Achievable Eavesdropping Rate
The eavesdropper uses MRC to process the received signal in (8) . After performing MRC, the processed signal at the eavesdropper is in (66) on top of this page.
The achievable eavesdropping rate at the eavesdropper is in (67) on top of this page.
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate
From (63), (65), and (67), the following lemma is given. Lemma 2: When downlink training phase AN-aiding scheme is applied, the achievable rate of the considered system is
and R E are given in (63), (65), and (67), respectively.
V. RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In this section, optimization algorithms for power allocation are proposed to maximize the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system.
A. AN in Training Phase

1) MRT:
Plugging (44) and (35) into (54), the achievable legitimate rate of the considered system when using AN in downlink training phase with MRT can be rewritten as
2) ZF:
Plugging (46) and (35) into (57), the achievable legitimate rate of the considered system when using AN in downlink training phase with ZF can be rewritten in (70) on the top of the next page, where
3) Achievable Eavesdropping Rate:
The achievable eavesdropping rate in (60) is re-arranged as in (71) on the top of the next page, where
The achievable secrecy rate of the considered system when donwlink training AN scheme is applied can be re-formulated as
where A = {MRT, ZF}. To maximize the secrecy rate, the transmit power ratio for pilot/AN transmission needs to
be optimized. The proposed problem is
Making the variable change α (73) is equivalent to the following problem:
and a 8 = A 6 . As its objective function in (74a) is difference of two concave (d.c.) functions ln (a 1 + a 2 x) + ln (a 3 + a 4 x) and ln(a 5 + a 6 x) + ln(a 7 + a 8 x), (74) is a simple d.c. optimization problem, which can be solved by d.c. iterations [26] . We now develop a simple path-following procedure of extremely low complexity as a feasible point found in each iteration is available in closedform. We will use the following inequalities for all x > 0 and x > 0:
where (75) follows from the concavity of ln(1 + bx) while (76) follows from the convexity of ln(1 + 1/x) [27, Th. 6]. Suppose x (κ) is a feasible point found from (κ − 1)th iteration. Then applying (75) and (76) yields
We solve the following lower bounding maximization problem to generate the next feasible point x
which admits a closed-form solution
. Since x (κ+1) and x (κ) are the optimal solution and a feasible point for (78), it is true that
i.e. x (κ+1) is a better feasible point than x (κ) for (74). Then, it can be easily shown that (see e.g. [26] , [27] ) the sequence {x (κ) } of improved feasible points converges to a solution satisfying the Karush-Kuh-Tucker condition for (74). Such iterative procedure is formalized by Algorithm 1. 
B. AN in Both Downlink Training Phase and Information Transmission Phase 1) MRT:
Plugging (44) into (63), the achievable legitimate rate of the considered system when using AN in both downlink training phase and payload data transmission phase with MRT is re-formulated as in (80) on the top of the next page. with
2) ZF: Plugging (46) into (65), the achievable legitimate rate of the considered system when using AN in both downlink training phase and payload data transmission phase with ZF is re-formulated as in (81), as shown at the top of this page, where
3) Achievable Eavesdropping Rate:
4) Proposed Optimization Algorithm:
The achievable secrecy rate is re-arranged as (83) on the top of this page.
We seek the values for pilot transmit power ratio in downlink phase, α p , and data transmit power ratio in payload data transmission phase, α IT p , to maximize the achievable rate of the considered system. The proposed optimization problem is
Make the variable changes α 
) is a feasible point found from the (κ − 1)th iteration. In iterating x (κ+1) consider (74) for
Recalling definition (77), x (κ+1) defined by (79) is a better feasible point than x (κ) :
Similarly, in iterating y (κ+1) consider (74) for
With definition (77), according to (79),
is a better feasible point than y (κ) :
Thus, in Algorithm 2 we propose another path-following computational procedure for solving (85). 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results based on Monte-Carlo simulation are presented to prove the correctness of our analysis. Without loss of generality, the following parameters are fixed throughout this section:
In Fig. 2 , the tightness of our approximations is demonstrated. In this setup, an equal resource allocation scheme is applied, i.e., α p = α n = 1 2K . We can see that the approximations are very tight. Therefore, these approximations will be used in the following numerical work. It is witnessed that ZF scheme shows better performance than MRT scheme. It is because the undesired signals in ZF scheme is much smaller than that in the MRT scheme. In the MRT case, using AN in both phases has better performance than that of using AN in downlink training. The reason is that in the MRT case, the undesired signals from other users is the dominant part of interference. By using AN in payload data transmission phase, a part of transmit power that causes the interference turns into AN for confusing the eavesdropper. In the ZF case, the secrecy performance of using AN in downlink training scheme is slightly better than that of using AN in both phases scheme. It is because the user of using AN in both phases scheme suffers from the leakage of AN. Meanwhile, in using AN in downlink training scheme, the user is free from that interference. Fig. 3 shows the effect of the number of antennas at the BS, M , the number of antennas at the eavesdropper, N , and the number of users, K, on the secrecy performance of the two proposed AN schemes. In this setup, an equal power allocation is deployed, i.e., α p = α n = 1 2K . As increasing the number of antennas at the BS and/or reducing the number of users, the secrecy performance in the two proposed AN schemes enhances. It is because each user will receive less undesired signals of the other users and the transmit power of the desired signals is also increased. Besides, increasing the number of antennas at the eavesdropper will enhance the performance of the illegitimate side. As a result, the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system decreases. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 demonstrate the convergence of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively. The parameters . After a few iterations the object function of achievable secrecy rate converges to a maximum value. Fig. 6 provides the performance comparison between the optimal AN transmit power scheme and the equal power allocation scheme. In this setup, M = 30 and N = 50 By applying the optimal power allocation, the secrecy performance of the two proposed AN schemes is better than that by the equal power allocation. Particularly, the performance of the two proposed AN schemes is similar when the optimal power allocation is applied. Besides, as the transmit power increases, the improvement in MRT scheme is more significant than that in the ZF scheme. In MRT scheme, the legitimate users suffer from a larger amount of interference than in the ZF scheme. Therefore, the optimization scheme shows a bigger gain.
In Fig. 7 , a comparison among AN-aiding schemes is presented. In this simulation, we compare the secrecy performance of the two proposed AN schemes with the conventional payload data transmission phase AN-aiding scheme in which AN is placed in the null space of the estimated down-link channel. The results show that the two proposed schemes outperform the conventional AN in payload data transmission phase. The reason is that in the conventional payload data transmission phase AN-aiding scheme, both users and eavesdropper has their best estimated CSI in the training phase. In addition, in payload data transmission phase, a significant part of transmit power of the BS will be used as jamming power to degrade the performance of the eavesdropper. Consequently, the achievable rate at the user is reduced. Meanwhile, in training phase AN-aiding scheme, the outcome of power allocation process is the smaller channel estimation error at the users. As a consequence, using more power to transmit information in the payload data transmission phase leads to a better achievable rate at the users while the achievable rate at the eavesdropper is kept sufficiently low. Using AN in both phases offers the considered system a flexible solution to maximize its secrecy rate at the price of a higher complexity in the power allocation process.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, two AN-aiding schemes have been proposed to enhance the secrecy performance of a massive MIMO network in the presence of a multiple-antenna eavesdropper. Analytical expressions and tight approximations for the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system have been developed to investigate the performance of the two proposed AN-aiding schemes in the presence of imperfect channel estimation. The results have shown that using AN in the downlink training phase of the massive MIMO networks can effectively suppress the eavesdropping side. Besides, deploying AN in both downlink training phase and payload data transmission phase facilitates the system a flexible solution to enhance the secrecy performance at the price of higher complexity.
APPENDIX A
The term E a MRT kk can be calculated as
where X is Chi-squared distributed with 2M degrees of freedom. The expression of E |a E a ZF kk can be computed as follows: 
